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The extent of Moldova's economic collapse exceeded that of all the other former Soviet republics 
following the break-up of the Soviet Union. This reflected not only dislocation related to the secession of 
Transdniestria shortly after independence, but also the unusually severe terms-of-trade shock suffered by 
Moldova at that time. During the communist era, Moldova had sent its agriculture-related output to 
markets throughout the Soviet Union and had received subsidised energy imports in return. This 
arrangement collapsed spectacularly with independence, when Moldova found itself cut off from export 
markets and, as Russian energy prices adjusted to world levels, faced with an exponential increase in 
import costs. By the late 1990s Moldova's official economy had shrunk to around two-fifths of its late-
Soviet size, in contrast to most of the former communist economies in Central Europe, which had 
managed to return to 1990 levels. Among the former Soviet republics, only Georgia and Tadjikistan 
approached the scale of decline experienced in Moldova. 
This poor showing belies a number of policy successes achieved in the early years of the transition 
period, when Moldova earned a reputation as one of the leading reformers in the region. By the mid-
1990s, Moldova's policymakers had successfully tackled a number of first-generation reforms, such as 
freeing up the vast majority of prices and liberalising domestic trade. Similarly, responsible monetary 
policies had brought a relatively quick end to the hyperinflation experienced in the early 1990s, while 
liberalised trade policies (on paper at least) paved the way for Moldova to become one of the first CIS 
countries to join the WTO. In terms of privatisation, a mass voucher scheme launched in mid-1994 
relatively quickly sold off the state-run small and medium-sized enterprise sector. As a result, Moldova's 
private sector now accounts for 80 per cent of official GDP, dominating not only the nascent services 
sector but also agriculture, following the break-up of collective farms in the late 1990s, and industry, 
following the post-privatisation restructuring of two-thirds of the country's manufacturing enterprises. 
These achievements in moving towards a market, or at least a hybrid, economy have nevertheless failed 
to bring any significant improvements to the lives of most Moldovans. Despite the relatively strong 
economic growth recorded since 2000, Moldova still ranks as the poorest country in Europe. 
Malnourishment and disease have proliferated since independence, life expectancy has fallen, and per 
capita GDP is now equivalent to that of many third-world countries. Even though average wages rose by 
almost 50 per cent in real terms in 2000—2001, they remained under $2 per day and well below 
Romanian or Russian levels. As wages cover less than two-thirds of the minimum consumer budget, 
many Moldovans are forced to rely on the shadow economy or household garden plots to survive, and 
have yet to feel economically any more secure. According to an opinion poll conducted in early 2003, as 
much as 60 per cent of the population claimed that their personal situation had either not improved or had 
actually deteriorated over the previous year, despite the strong economic growth and rising real wages 
reported by official data. 
The fall in Moldova's living standards since independence has produced a remarkable exodus of 
somewhere between one-fifth and one-quarter of the workforce in search of jobs abroad, primarily in 
Western Europe and Russia. The remittances that these workers send home through official channels 
amount to 15—17 per cent of the country's total GDP. Adding in the sums sent through unofficial 
channels (legal and illegal) would double that figure. Although this helps to stabilise the currency and to 
sustain family members left in Moldova, it underlines the extent of Moldova's brain drain, which has 
deprived the Moldovan economy of many of its youngest, most skilled and most entrepreneurial workers. 
                                                          
1 Source: The EU & Moldova. On a Fault-line of Europe. Edited by Ann Lewis. Federal Trust. London 2000. 
A narrow economic base 
The scale of labour migration since independence, and of the country's poverty more generally, underlines 
the failure of elites and institutions to transcend Moldova's unfortunate Soviet inheritance. 
Notwithstanding the relative success of first-generation reforms, Moldova's leadership has for the most 
part dragged its feet in implementing the structural reforms needed to protect the country from economic 
shocks. The break-up of the Soviet Union left Moldova even more susceptible to these sorts of shock than 
most of the other republics. Unlike many of the Central Asian countries, for instance, Moldova lacked a 
readily exploitable fuel resource to drive economic growth, export earnings or investment inflows. 
Instead, Moldova entered the transition dependent on fuel imports and reliant on the sort of agriculture-
related exports that struggle to penetrate hard-currency markets. 
Moldova's narrow agricultural economy is partly a function of geography, which endowed it with a 
favourable climate and the fertile 'black earth' that covers more than three-quarters of its agricultural land. 
It is also a function of the extreme economic concentration favoured by Soviet economic planners. For 
decades, Moldova acted as a major supplier of food and beverages to the other republics, providing 
almost 20 per cent of the Soviet Union's grapes and wine, 30 per cent of its tobacco, and 10—15 per cent 
of its fruit and vegetables. This economic concentration intensified even further after independence, when 
Transdniestria's secession from the rest of the country deprived Moldova of much of its industrial 
capacity, since Soviet planners had situated most of the country's heavy industry and electricity-
generating capacity in Transdniestria. The importance of the farming sector in the rest of Moldova rose 
sharply as a result, and the industrial sector become disproportionately reliant on agro-processing plants. 
These plants now account for over half of total industrial output, with wine alone responsible for one 
quarter of total manufacturing sales. In terms of exports, the economic concentration is even more 
extreme, with agriculture and agro-processing accounting for nearly two-thirds of export revenue. (Please 
note that all the statistics in this article, with the exception of the section on Transdniestria, refer to 
Moldova excluding Transdniestria.) 
Moldova's unusually narrow economic base has rendered the need for meaningful structural reform that 
much more urgent. In order to reduce the serious risks posed by bad weather, Moldova needs to 
encourage the expansion of industries and services not related to the agricultural sector. Even then, as 
agriculture and agro-processing will inevitably remain of undeniable economic importance, Moldova also 
needs to boost competitiveness in these traditional sectors. Without greater competitiveness, these sectors 
will find it difficult to penetrate the EU market, which offers no concessions to key Moldovan exports 
such as wine, fruit or vegetables, yet appears to be the most obvious alternative to the less predictable 
Russian market. Shifts in Russian trade policies and import demands have repeatedly underlined the need 
to diversify into new markets, most notably following the collapse in exports to Russia during the rouble 
crisis in 1998, and more recently Russia's decision to introduce quotas for key Moldovan exports such as 
sugar, tobacco and liquor. 
During the early transition period (the first 5—7 years), successive governments delayed the reform of the 
agricultural sector and the privatisation of key sectors such as wine production, in spite of the urgent need 
to address the economy's structural shortcomings. At the time of independence, Moldova inherited 
collectivised farms accustomed to operating in a centrally-planned environment in which market signals 
did not apply. Enterprises had responded to administrative targets rather than consumer preferences, and 
benefited from favourable procurement prices and subsidised inputs. Easy access to credit and soft budget 
constraints had obviated the need to consider profitability or efficiency. The agro-processing sector in 
Soviet times featured similar distortions, as it could rely on a centralised production and distribution 
system, captive markets within the Soviet Union and protection from competitors abroad. 
Both the agro-processing and agricultural sectors were therefore woefully ill-suited to compete in a more 
market-oriented environment. They lacked efficient distribution and supply channels, expertise in 
packaging and marketing, and effective means of controlling quality. Not least, distorted Soviet energy 
prices had resulted in massively inefficient production techniques. Not needing to account for input costs, 
Moldovan producers had largely ignored efficiency concerns and consumed several times more energy 
per unit of production than Western producers. 
On paper at least, Moldova's first attempts to tackle these structural issues came shortly after 
independence. As early as December 1991, Moldova approved a Land Code and began the process of 
transferring land from state to private ownership. However, these reforms sought only to restructure 
collective farms into joint-stock companies and ignored the need to reinvigorate the agricultural sector by 
breaking up collective structures. Moreover, for the next few years, the resistance of powerful vested 
interests among collective farm managers, who were well connected politically at both regional and 
national levels, effectively blocked consideration of more substantial sectoral reforms. Vested interests in 
wine and tobacco, two of the most important processing sectors, prevented any significant restructuring 
there as well, with parliament waiting until 2000 to approve at long last the legislation needed to privatise 
the large enterprises that the state still controlled in these sectors. 
Meaningful reform in the agricultural sector began only slightly before the decision to privatise the large 
state-owned wine and tobacco enterprises. Attempts to break up collective farms picked up moderately 
during the second half of the 1990s, but only really began with the launch of the National Land 
Programme in 1998. This USAID-supported programme was designed to reduce the unwieldy scale of 
Moldova's inherited agricultural enterprises by turning coUectivised holdings over to individual farmers 
and business-like corporate farms. By the end of 2000, the National Land Programme had emerged as one 
of the most successful projects of its type in the former Soviet Union. Over a relatively short period of 
time, it liquidated almost 900 collective farms, creating more than a 1000 debt-free agricultural 
enterprises and hundreds of thousands of individual landowners. These new owners formed peasant farms 
and rural household farms, and now account for over 80 per cent of agricultural output. Despite concerns 
about excessive fragmentation in the newly-reformed sector, preliminary evidence suggests that newly-
created small and medium-sized private farms are proving more productive than larger holdings. 
The post-privatisation reforms under way in the agricultural sector since 2000 have proved more difficult 
than the initial privatisation programme. These follow-on reforms are needed to ensure effective 
regulation of the various new relationships that have emerged within the sector and to establish a market 
infrastructure, including networks of agro-stores and machinery stations, Western-style service co-
operatives and an efficient commodity exchange. Farmers also need improved access to advice and 
expertise on legal, technical and marketing issues. Not least, the new private farmers require financial 
institutions able to serve their needs, including through mortgage lending and savings and credit 
associations. 
The creation of viable market-based structures has proceeded only slowly. Although the process of 
transferring land from less efficient to more efficient agricultural producers is under way, it still occurs 
primarily through leasing arrangements due to limited progress in developing a viable land market. 
Similarly, the commodity exchange in operation since 2002 remains for the most part experimental, and 
has yet to result in a fully developed wholesale market for agricultural products. As a result, powerful 
local actors continue to capture sizeable rents through their local-level dominance, and show little interest 
in permitting the transparency which would be possible through more effective price signals and 
liberalised commodity trade. 
Moldova's slow progress on post-privatisation reforms has precluded anything but limited progress 
towards addressing the negative trends apparent in the agricultural sector in recent years. These include a 
reduction in the area planted to high-value crops (such as peaches and apricots) and an increase in the 
area devoted to low-value crops (such as cereals and potatoes). There is also a continuing problem with 
low productivity of both land and labour. This is likely to have worsened over the last decade, as 
displaced industrial workers have gravitated towards the safety net offered by the agricultural sector. The 
government has lacked the means to invest in the irrigation system, and hardening budget constraints 
have sparked a sharp drop in investment in key inputs such as fertiliser. 
A sustainable basis for growth 
The agricultural sector's productivity problems, coupled with the slow pace of economic diversification, 
raise questions over the sustainability of the economic recovery under way in Moldova since 2000. At 
first glance this recovery seems impressive. The cumulative 16 per cent GDP growth recorded in 2000-
2002 has drawn a line under the protracted decline of the preceding years. Annual inflation fell to a record 
low during this period, and the currency remained relatively stable, in contrast to the high inflation and 
extreme currency collapse of the late 1990s. This in turn allowed the central bank to boost liquidity and 
encourage lending by aggressively lowering interest rates and remonetising the economy. 
The government, for its part, has achieved a remarkable fiscal correction. For years, Moldova's political 
elites resisted adjusting their unrealistic expenditure commitments to fit a shrinking revenue base. In 
particular, they proved unwilling or unable to tackle rent-seeking by vested interests eager to secure 
preferential treatment or subsidies. Only once external funding dried up during the financial crisis of the 
late 1990s did the government finally accept the need for fiscal consolidation. By 2002, it had narrowed 
its budget deficit to under 1 per cent, from as much as 10 per cent in the mid-1990s, and reduced 
expenditure to below 25 per cent of GDP, from almost 40 per cent in 1996. This proved possible only 
through a steep reduction in net lending to the enterprise sector, better targeting of social assistance, and 
the almost complete elimination of quasi-fiscal subsidies, including directed bank credits to favoured 
sectors. 
However it is by no means clear that these impressive achievements will suffice to sustain the 6—7 per 
cent annual growth rates promised by the government over the medium term. Most importantly, the 
optimistic official forecasts ignore the extent to which a number of unusually fortuitous circumstances 
have converged to drive economic recovery. Not least, Moldova has benefited from favourable weather 
conditions. The importance of this should not be underestimated in an economy as concentrated as 
Moldova's, or with a similar past history of crises sparked by bad weather. An unusually strong recovery 
in three key export markets, Russia, Ukraine and Romania, has also proved crucial. Just as plummeting 
demand in these countries had catastrophic effects in Moldova in the late 1990s, so their robust recovery 
has buttressed Moldova's macroeconomic stability since 2000. Finally, Moldova has capitalised on a 
significant shift in relative exchange rates, caused by the leu's collapse during the regional financial crisis 
of the late 1990s. Faced with a sudden rise in the local-currency price of imports, and a corresponding 
improvement in the price competitiveness of exports, Moldova has succeeded at least in reducing the 
external imbalances that impeded growth in the 1990s. 
Lagging investment 
These favourable one-off factors cannot be counted upon to converge again in a similar fashion over the 
medium term. Instead, the economy still appears vulnerable. Most importantly, investment since 
independence has fallen well below what is needed to ensure the steady technological improvements 
needed to build a productive and broadly-based economy. Consumption, rather than investment, proved 
instrumental in achieving the economic recovery of 2000—2002, with the rise in consumption in 2002, 
for instance, considerably outpacing GDP growth. This reflects in part the increase in wages and pensions 
achieved by the communist government, which fuelled a surge in consumption-related imports. As a 
result, net exports remain a considerable drag on growth despite the currency's real depreciation and the 
export sector's recovery. 
The moderate 4 per cent rise in investment reported in 2002 should therefore be viewed against a very 
low base. At under 17 per cent of GDP, fixed capital investment in Moldova remains extremely low even 
by regional standards. Neither the government nor the enterprise sector appears able to invest to the extent 
required, while inflows of foreign direct investment, let alone portfolio investment, are negligible 
compared with the more dynamic transition economies in the region. A total of only around $725m in 
FDI has flowed into Moldova since independence. This translates into around $200 per head, compared 
with around $1000 in Poland and $2000 in Hungary. 
Even Russian investors, who are most familiar with Moldova and relatively cash-rich after several years 
of high oil prices, have only belatedly begun to compensate for the limited interest showed by their 
Western counterparts. Russian companies have only recently begun to consolidate their presence in 
Moldova, which lies across key routes for Russian exports to South-Eastern Europe. In the last few years, 
Russian investment has begun to flow into infrastructure projects, including gas transportation, the 
production and distribution of electricity, rail transport, Danube port facilities, fuel storage and petrol 
stations. The presence of Russian companies is growing in Moldova's wine and machinery sectors. 
However, without more interest from Western investors, investment inflows into Moldova remain 
insufficient. In theory, at least, the communist  administration is open to Western investment. The 
government's programme acknowledges the importance of FDI, particularly in the light of Moldova's 
inadequate natural resources and low personal and corporate incomes. A series of conflicts between the 
Moldova authorities and foreign investors has nevertheless sent opposite signals. The government decided 
in early 2002 to review the list of foreign investors benefiting from income tax exemption (shortly after 
unveiling its 'Investment Strategy for the Republic of Moldova') and has presided over some controversial 
renationalisation plans since coming to power. Some of the worst publicity has involved the largest 
Western investor, Union Fenosa, which has seen the legality of its purchase of three of Moldova's five 
electricity distributors in 2000 questioned in court. 
Reforming the business environment 
Even without these high-profile cases, Moldova would still struggle to attract significant inflows of 
Western FDI. Not least, the country is handicapped by its less than ideal endowment, which includes a 
small domestic market and the unresolved issue of Transdniestria. Neither the current administration nor 
its predecessor has done much to compensate for this. To a large extent, this reflects the power of vested 
sectoral interests, and of state officials unwilling to surrender the prerogatives left over from their Soviet-
era role in running the economy. 
The continued power of these groups has helped to deter potential investors, and the expansion of the 
SME sector more generally, by perpetuating an unpredictable legal environment and convoluted 
procedures for obtaining licenses, permits, and certificates. For instance, the system of licensing 
businesses has changed little since the establishment of a chamber to licence most types of business 
activity in early 2002. The new chamber still needs to co-ordinate its decisions with the almost two dozen 
ministries and departments that it has theoretically replaced. Similarly, registration procedures remain 
costly and time-consuming. Entrepreneurs complain that it takes months to start a business, or that they 
are discouraged even before registering, due to the range of permits and authorisations required from 
local authorities. In a significant number of cases, this either precludes entrepreneurial activity completely 
or else drives it underground. 
Investors are further put off by the unstable and opaque tax system, which remains hostile towards 
enterprises, and by problems of excessive inspections of enterprises. Although the authorities have 
reduced the number of inspecting bodies, the process has yet to become any more efficient. The various 
inspecting bodies are still not subject to legal limits on the number of times they can inspect a given 
enterprise, nor are they required to co-ordinate their activities with each other. Enterprises continue to 
complain about excessive controls and the lack of professionalism of the inspecting authorities, and 
generally avoid legal action in the knowledge that most court decisions favour the inspectors. Finally, 
pervasive corruption remains a major concern. On most major scales of corruption, Moldova continues to 
rank at or near the top for the region, generally ahead of countries such as Russia and Ukraine. Despite 
vowing to fight corruption on coming to power in 2001, the current communist leadership has so far done 
little to address the problem. 
Moldova is not alone among transition countries in failing to address the shortcomings of its business 
environment. In line with most other former Soviet republics, Moldova has struggled to establish 
transparent and accountable institutions. As a result, powerful vested interests have become entrenched 
both in key economic sectors and within the bureaucracy. They have benefited from the country's weak 
and unaccountable political structures, which encourage rent-seeking rather than entrepreneurship, and 
have succeeded in slowing the structural reforms that might otherwise endanger their rents. 
The reform process under the Communist Party of Moldova (CPRM) 
Unlike much of Central Europe, Moldova's efforts to redress its skewed incentive structures and 
accelerate reforms have not benefited from any credible promise of imminent EU membership. In the 
more advanced transition countries, the promise of EU accession presented an effective means for 
constraining policy options and forcing through tough decisions, while at the same time providing a 
coherent framework for reform and technical assistance. Although Moldova has long sought closer 
integration, including through a PCA agreed in 1994, the EU has never been able to suggest that 
accession is anything more than a distant, abstract possibility. 
In the absence of a broad consensus united behind the goal of EU accession, the progress of reform in 
Moldova has had to depend on the occasional appointment of reformers to key positions, as in the case of 
the reformist government in 1999, or on the harsh realities created by Moldova's financing constraints. 
The crisis in emerging markets in the late 1990s was a case in point. By putting an end to most external 
financing inflows, it forced the government to work more closely with multilateral organisations and to 
contemplate the sort of expenditure rationalisation it had long postponed. 
The state's depleted financial resources have probably also helped to prevent a lurch away from reform 
since 2001, when the CPRM won decisive control of parliament and subsequently the presidency. The 
communists came to power on an anti-reform platform and with a long-standing antipathy towards the 
multilaterals. They tried initially to use their control of both executive and legislative branches to roll 
back reforms passed by previous centre-right administrations. In particular, the CPRM hoped to undo in 
part the break-up of collective farms, re-assert state control over the allocation of agricultural inputs and 
outputs, and reinstate a range of price controls. It is likely that financial constraints played a major role in 
forcing the CPRM to retreat, however unwillingly, from this agenda. 
Unfortunately for Moldova, the constraints imposed by depleted government coffers or the promise of 
multilateral financing are hardly the same as a credible promise of imminent EU membership. The CPRM 
has only partially retreated from its state-centred economic agenda, and still hopes to achieve many of its 
goals not through radical reforms but through administrative methods, such as strengthened tax 
administration, increased domestic borrowing, and legislating minimum wage increases. Although some 
of these measures have helped to raise incomes and contributed to economic expansion since the CPRM 
came to power, the party's continued resistance to real reform is worrisome, and several of the most 
important structural reforms have slowed noticeably since 2001. 
The CPRM authorities appear reluctant to admit this, and in 2003 were still rejecting IMF criticism of 
their slow progress in reform (reducing subsidies to agriculture, dismantling restrictions on exports and 
privatising key sectors). In the end, the IMF and World Bank decided to suspend credit to the Moldovan 
government due to its failure to comply with the co-ordinated terms. The government's attitude underlines 
the ongoing internal debate within the CPRM over the need to accept reforms, a debate that has resulted 
in considerable policy confusion. The results for 2003 are quite contradictory. While the country's GDP 
continued to expand, inflation intensified, the trade balance worsened, and state external and internal 
debts increased. Most importantly, the CPRM has been unable to develop clear answers to several basic 
questions, including how to improve the entrepreneurial and investment climate, how to bring the shadow 
economy into the open, and how to deal with the pervasive problems of corruption. Until the government 
finds answers to these questions, Moldova will struggle to establish a sustainable basis for growth. 
Transdniestria as a 'parallel' developing region 
The unresolved question of Transdniestria's political status has compounded this policy confusion. 
Despite more concerted efforts since 2002 to address the Transdniestria issue, the integration of the two 
economies remains a distant prospect. To some extent, the reintegration process will benefit from the 
range of economic links that have survived despite the protracted political stand-off. The rest of Moldova 
takes around a quarter of Transdniestria's exports, while the interests of private foreign investors have 
ensured that some links have been re-established in a number of key sectors. However, over more than 10 
years of quasi-independence, Transdniestria has built up a full range of parallel structures and a 
legislative basis for its own banking sector, currency, tax system, trade regime and system of property 
rights. Even with international assistance, the alignment of two separate financial, economic and social 
systems promises to be a complicated and politically charged process. 
Moreover, the process of reintegration will bring considerable short and medium-term costs for Moldova, 
due to the poor state of Transdniestria's economy. This has seen far fewer structural changes than in the 
rest of Moldova since the break-up of the Soviet Union. Although reform has speeded up somewhat over 
the last two years, Transdniestria's leaders still retain considerable economic control. They play a leading 
role in the joint-stock companies established in the industrial sector, and have only recently begun the 
process of reforming the agricultural sector, which has required significant government subsidies and 
directed credits to avoid complete collapse. Although the Transdniestrian government finally approved a 
Land Code in 2002, in order to begin reducing its role in the agricultural sector, a referendum on private 
land ownership in April 2003 failed to secure the turnout needed for approval. 
Delays in the structural reform process have brought similar problems to those experienced in the rest of 
Moldova during the first decade of independence. These include extremely low levels of investment and 
productivity, insufficent working capital, and widespread non-payment or barter transactions between 
enterprises. Transdniestria has relied on only around a dozen exporting industrial enterprises to supply 
more than two-thirds of GDP and the bulk of budget revenue, and has needed easy credits and cheap 
energy imports from Russia to disguise the uncompetitiveness of these enterprises. Forced to loosen 
monetary and credit policies in order to compensate for the slow pace of reform and chronic external 
imbalances, the Transdniestrian leadership precipitated soaring inflation and a sharp currency decline in 
the second half of the 1990s, as well as a considerable contraction in output. Although Transdniestria's 
economy recovered briefly during the first three-quarters of 2001, the Moldovan government cut this 
short by introducing new customs procedures in September of that year as part of the country's WTO 
accession requirements. The introduction of new Moldovan customs seals, to which Transdniestrian 
exporters were denied access, precipitated a collapse in Transdniestria's exports. 
Transdniestria's dire economic situation since late 2001 has at least helped to convince the region's 
leadership of the need for some reforms, in the hope of securing the investment inflows needed to 
stabilise the economy and shore up the public finances. In addition to approving a new Land Code, the 
Transdniestrian government has begun cash privatisation sales of major industrial enterprises, including 
the region's fixed-line telephone monopoly sold in January 2003. Other planned sales include stakes in 
major strategic enterprises, including in the metallurgy and electricity sectors. Perhaps even more 
importantly, the dislocation caused by the introduction of the new Moldovan customs seals in 2001 might 
also have spurred a greater interest in economic co-operation. Although Transdniestria denounced the 
Moldovan government for imposing what it considered to be an economic blockade, the region's 
leadership subsequently appeared more open to expanding bilateral ties. Transdniestria is more reliant on 
exports than the rest of Moldova, and recognises that increased co-operation could help to overcome its 
uncertain international status, which has impeded the investment and exports needed to ensure 
macroeconomic and social stability. 
For the whole of Moldova, closer economic co-operation and eventual reintegration promise obvious 
benefits. Resolution of the Transdniestria issue would eliminate a major source of distraction and permit 
greater investment and political stability. It would also help to broaden the country's narrow economy, 
through access to the machine-building, light industry, electricity and metal sectors that are at the core of 
Transdniestria's economy. However, reintegration on its own is unlikely to solve Moldova's problems. In 
order to tackle its considerable economic difficulties, Moldova will above all need to improve its 
administrative capacity and strengthen its existing institutions. In particular, Moldova needs a more 
effective state administration in order to tackle widespread tax evasion and exemptions, and to ensure the 
allocation of resources based on more strategic priorities. More generally, it needs administrative reforms 
to ensure a government responsive to citizens and less beholden to the powerful interests currently 
entrenched within state structures and atop key sectors. Reforms of this kind will prove critical if 
Moldova is to achieve the robust long-term growth needed to address problems of widespread 
impoverishment, declining provision of even basic government services, and the continuing exodus of 
much of the workforce. 
 
 
 
 
 
Moldova's Main Macroeconomic Indicators 
 
 
 
 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
"Real GDP (% change, year on year) " -30.9 -1.4 -5.9 1.6 -6.5 -3.4 2.1 6.1 7.2
as % of 1993 -30.9 -31.9 -35.9 -34.8 -39.9 -41.1 -39.9 -36.2 -31.6
Nominal GDP (Lei million) "4,737" "6,479" "7,798" "8,917" "9,122" "12,322" "16,020" "19,052" "22,040
Nominal GDP (USD million) "1,165" "1,441" "1,694" "1,929" "1,698" "1,171" "1,288" "1,481" "1,624"
GDP per head (USD) 323 400 471 537 473 327 354 408 448
"Industrial output (% real change, year -27.8 -3.9 -6.5 0.0 -15.0 -11.6 7.7 13.7 10.6
as % of 1993 -27.8 -30.5 -35.0 -35.0 -44.8 -51.2 -47.4 -40.2 -33.9
"Agricultural output (% real change, -24.6 1.9 -11.9 11.4 -11.6 -8.4 -3.3 6.4 3.0
as % of 1993 -24.6 -23.2 -32.3 -24.6 -33.3 -38.9 -41.0 -37.2 -35.3
"Investments in fixed capital (% real -51.0 -16.0 -8.0 -8.0 10.0 -22.0 -15.0 11.0 4.1
as % of 1993 -51.0 -58.8 -62.1 -65.2 -61.7 -70.1 -74.6 -71.8 -70.6
Exports of goods (fob; USD million) 618 739 823 890 644 474 477 567 660
Imports of goods (fob; USD million) 672 794 "1,075" "1,238" "1,032" 611 770 879 "1,038"
Trade balance (USD million) -54 -55 -252 -348 -388 -137 -294 -311 -378
as % GDP -4.6 -3.8 -14.9 -18.0 -22.9 -11.7 -22.8 -21.0 -23.3
Current-account balance (USD million) -82 -98 -191 -275 -335 -69 -97 -95 -103
as % GDP -7.0 -6.8 -11.3 -14.2 -19.7 -5.8 -7.5 -6.4 -6.4
Foreign direct investment (nee yearly 18 73 23 78 76 38 129 156 110
State external debt (USD million) 506 659 766 "1,004" "1,003" 935 997 930 971
as % GDP 43.4 45.7 45.2 52.1 59.1 79.8 77.4 62.8 59.8
State internal debt (Lei million) 270 477 737 984 "1,572" "1,910" "2,022" "2,400" "2,821"
Consolidated budget deficit (% of -5.8 -5.8 -9.7 -7.5 -3.3 -3.2 -1.0 0.0 -0.5
Nominal wage (monthly average; USD) 26.7 31.9 40.7 47.5 46.6 28.9 32.8 42.3 51.0
"Real wage (monthly average; % -40.8 1.6 5.4 4.9 5.5 -12.5 2.0 21.6 21.0
Consumer price inflation (end-period; 104.6 23.8 15.1 11.2 18.3 43.7 18.4 6.3 4.4
Consumer price inflation (annual 487.0 30.0 24.0 12.0 8.0 39.0 31.1 9.6 5.2
Exchange rate (end-period; Lei/ USD) 4.27 4.50 4.65 4.66 8.32 11.59 12.38 13.09 13.82
Exchange rate (annual average; Lei/ 
USD)
4.07 4.50 4.60 4.62 5.37 10.52 12.43 12.87 13.57
 
 
"Source: National Bank of Moldova, Department of Statistics and Sociology, C1SR" 'All figures exclude Transdniestria, for which no suitable figures 
are available." The data start from 1994 because previous years' statistics are unreliable. 
